University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

5-26-1965

People v. Davis
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Davis 62 Cal.2d 791 (1965).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/648

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

[Crim. No. 7590. In Bank. May 26, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD
MARCELLUS DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] CrimiD.al Law-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-In a
murder prosecution, defendant's confession and his diagram
of the murder scene were inadmissible where, at the time his
statement was recorded, he was under arrest, the investigation
had focused on him, the purpose of the interrogation was to
elicit a confession, and there was no showing that he was
allowed to see counsel, that he effectively waived this right, or
that he was informed of his right to remain silent.
IS] Id.-Appeal-lr.eserviDg Questions-Evidenee-Admissions.Where a murder case was tried before the decision in
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 464; [2] Criminal
Law, § 1080(2); [3] Criminal Law, § 1382(27); [4, 5] Homicide,
§ 118; [6, 7, 10] Criminal Law, § 556; [8] Criminal Law, 1558;

[9] Words azul Phrases.
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Escobedo v. nUnois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d
977], defendant's failure to object to the admission of his
confession and his diagram of the murder scene absent advice
on his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent,
does not preclude his raising the question on appeal.
[8] Id. - Appeal- Reversible Error - Evidence - Oonfessions.Though defendant in a murder prosecution testified to committing the same acts to which he confessed in a statement
obtained from him by the police without first advising him
of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent,
the error in admitting his confession resulted in a miscarriage
of justice where his testimony was not only impelled by the
erroneous admission of his confession, but the confession also
rebutted his defense that he was guilty of no more than second
degree murder, making it reasonably probable that a result
more favorable to defendant would have been reached absent
the error.
{4] Bomicide-Evidence-Motion Picture.-Wh-ere a motion picture of the victim of a gruesome murder is offered in evidence,
the court must determine its admissibility by weighing its
probative value against the danger of prejudice.
[6] Id.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence.-In a murder case
involving the defense that defendant killed the victim in a
heat of passion because he had read notebooks containing notes
passed between his wife and the victim which convinced him
that th-ey had been practicing Lesbians, it was not an abuse
of discretion to refuse to admit the entire notebooks on the
ground that the great bulk of the material was irrelevant and
immaterial where defendant was allowed to present the
passages he considered relevant, as circumstantial evidence of
his state of mind.
16a-6c] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualifications.-In a murder case where the defense attempted to prove
by two psychologists that defendant suffered from a temporary functional psychosis that made him legally insane, and
psychiatric experts for the prosecution denied such a disability
could exist, the trial court erred in ruling that only one with
medical training could testify on the issue.
[7] Id.-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualifications.-A witness
is qualified to testify about a matter calling for an expert
opinion if his peculiar skill, training, or experience enable him
to form an opinion that will be useful to the jury. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1870, subd. 9.)

[4] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 226-230; Am.Jur., Homicide
(1st ed § 451).
[6] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 293; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ 783).
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May 1965]

PEOPLE tI. DAVIS
(81 C.M '181; 44 CaLRpu. eM. 40Z P.2d lG]

793

[8] Id.-Evidence-Expert Witnesses Qua.1i1lca.tions. - Though
determination of the qualification of a proffered witness is
ordinarily within the trial court's discretion, the standards
used in the exercise of this discretion, like other questions of
law, are subject to review.
[9] Words and Phrases - cTunctionaJ Disorder." - A functional
disorder is, by definition, nonorganic and without a biological
cause.
[10] Oriminal Law-Evidence-Expert Witnesses-Qualifica.tions.
Not all psychologists are competent to give an expert opinion
on sanity; whether a psychologist qualifies as an expert on
sanity in a particular case depends on the facts of that ease,
the questions propounded to the witness, and his peculiar
qualifications.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. William P. Mabedy, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty reversed solely on the constitutional ground
announced in People v. Dorado, ante, p. 338 [42 Cal.Rptr.
169, 398 P.2d 361].

J. Perry Langford, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Norman
H. Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant killed his victim, Marion
Burnett, by pounding her on the head and arms six or more
times with a 16%-pound stone. A jury found him guilty of
murder of the first degree and sane at the time of the crime,
and fixed his penalty at death. This appeal is automatic.
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
Defendant's wife of six months, Dorothy. left him and
moved to her mother's house four days before the killing.
Defendant had asked her several times to return. She always
refused, in part apparently because of her belief that he was
having sexual relations with her unmarried friend, Marion.
Defendant had admitted to her that he had once engaged in
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sexual intercourse with Marion. Dorothy and Marion, however, remained close friends.
On the night of the killing, defendant went to his motherin-law's home to attempt again to persuade Dorothy to return
to him. Dorothy and Marion were there together, but were
leaving to go to Marion's home. When Dorothy remarked
that he arrived just as Marion was leaving, defendant became
angry and left. He walked across the street toward his home,
ran after he turned a corner, and headed toward Marion '8
home. When he arrived at the street on which Marion lived,
he crossed the street and picked up a large stone. He recrossed the street and hid behind a hedge near the sidewalk.
Several minutes later, Marion appeared alone. Defendant
advanced toward her, she turned to face him, and he beat her.
repeatedly with the stone. He then ran, threw the stone into
a bush, and returned to his home to join a game of dominoes.
An autopsy revealed that Marion was pregnant when she died.
At the trial on the issue of guilt, the prosecution sought to
prove that defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree
on the grounds that the killing was premeditated and deliberate and was perpetrated by lying in wait. (Pen. Code,
§ 189.) The prosecution argued as follows: Defendantregarded Marion as the obstacle to his reconciliation with his
wife. He may even have been carrying on an affair with
Marion that he wished to terminate, particularly because of
Marion's pregnancy. He decided early in the evening to kill
Marion, or at least to injure her. When the opportunity arose,
he ran ahead of her, secured a weapon, and then waited behind
the hedge to attack her.
The defendant testified that he had intercourse with Marion
only once, while he was drunk, and had no emission. He
denied knowing of her pregnancy before he killed her. He
presented a witness who testified that Marion accused the witness of being the father of her expected child. Defendant
also testified that he thought both women would pass the hedge
on their way to Marion's home. His defense was based on
three, interrelated theories:
(1) Defendant claimed that the killing was not premeditated. When he hid behind the hedge, he expected both women
to pass and he wanted only to scare or talk to them. When
Marion passed alone, defendant emerged from his hiding place.
She turned to him and he hid his face behind the stone. He
stated, "I didn't want to hit her at first but I didn't know
she couldn't have seen me. I kept thinking . . . if I don't

)
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she will tell Dorothy that I tried to or something and she might
leave me." He then hit Marion on the forehead, she raised
her arms in defense and screamed l and he hit her several more
times.
(2) Defendant claimed that the killing was committed in a
heat of passion. Several days before the killing, he read some
notes, passed between Dorothy, Marion, and a third girl in
high school the previous year, that convinced him that the girls
had been practicing Lesbians. Because Marion and Dorothy
were still friendly and were often together, defendant thought
their relationship was another reason for Dorothy's leaving
him. When Dorothy linked him with Marion on the night
of the killing, he became incensed. When he later encountered'
Marion, he killed her in a heat of passion.
(3) Defendant claimed that he did not have the mental
capacity at the time of the killing to premeditate and deliberate. A clinical psychologist, Dr. Robert G. Kaplan, testified
that defendant was suffering from a temporary functional
psychosis at the time of the killing and was incapable of wilful
premeditation and deliberation.
To prove premeditation and deliberation and also to show
the circumstances under which the killing was committed, the
prosecution introduced a full, corrected, and signed statement
made by defendant to the San Diego police. A diagram of
the murder scene made by him was also introduced. [1] Defendant was arrested before noon two days after the killing.
He was interrogated continuously by various police officers
until, at 8 0 'clock that evening he made the statemept, recorded by a police stenographer, that was introduced against
him. He made the diagram the next morning. Since the record
does not show what the officers said to defendant and what
he said to them before he made the recorded statement, it
does not appear at what point the investigation began to
focus on him. It is clear, however, that by the time the
recorded statement was commenced, the investigation had
focused on defendant and the purpose of the interrogation
was to elicit a confession. Although defendant talked to his
wife several times before making either the statement or the
diagram, there was no showing that he was allowed to see
counsel, that he had effectively waived his right to counsel,
or that he was informed of his right to remain silent. Under
these circumstances the statement and the diagram were
inadmissible by virtue of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [848.Ct.
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1768, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. (People v. Dorado, ante, p. 33S
[42 CalRptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]; People v. Stewart, aflte,
pp. 571, 576-581 [43 CalRptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97]; People
v. Lilliock, ante, pp. 618, 621 [43 Cal.Rptr. 699,401 P.2d 4];
see also Clifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649; Galarza Cruz
v. Delgado, 233 F.Supp. 944; State v. Dufour, - - R.I. - [206 A.2d 82, 85] ; State v. Neely, - - Ore. - - [398 P.2d
482].) [2] Moreover, since this case was tried before the
Escobedo decision, defendant's failure to object to the admission of the statement and the diagram into evidence does ,
not preclude his raising the question on appeal. (People v.
Hillery, ante, pp. 692, 711 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382]
and cases cited.)
[8] It is contended, however, that since defendant took
the stand and testified to committing the same acts he confessed to committing in his statement, we should make an
exception to the rule that the erroneous admission of a confession into evidence is necessarily prejudicial. (See People
v. Dorado, ante, pp. 338, 356-357 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398
P.2d 361]; People v. Stewarl, ante, pp. 571, 681 [43 Cal.
Rptr. 201,400 P.2d 97].) When defendant testi1ied, however,
the only substantial evidence that had been introduced con- i
.necting him with the crime was his statement and diagram.
-His testimony was therefore impelled by the erroneous admission of that evidence and cannot be segregated therefrom to
.. sustain the jUdgment. (People v. Dizon, 46 Cal.2d 456, 468
1296 P.2d 557] ; People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 463 -[34 Cal.
Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487]; see also People v. Mickelson, 59
Cal.2d 448, 449 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].)
Moreover, defendant's testimony at the trial was substantially less incriminating than his confession to the officers.
Defendant testi1ied that he did not lie in wait to harm his
victim or his wife but only intended to scare or talk to them
and that he decided to hit Marion with the rock only after
she appeared alone and recognized
If believed, this
testimony would have supported a finding of second rather
than first degree murder, and to rebut it the prosecution
relied on evidence of premeditation contained in defendant's
statement. In questioning defendant the officers were careful
to probe for such evidence, l and in his argument to the jury

him.

1" Q. To go baek to the evening hours of the 4th, you made quite a
point of asking your brother-in-law what time it
A. I didn't ask
him what time it was, I asked him was that eloek right. Q. What was
your reason' A. At the time I was on the verge of thinking of doing it
and thinkin&, of &,oing there to play dominoes. Q. What do you mean

was'

\
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the prosecutor stressed its importance to show that the killing
was premeditated. He pointed out that" Down at the police
station before he talked to a lawyer, before he had. time to
learn about the differences in penalties between different
degrees of murder, manslaughter, he was relatively frank
with the police and he said a number of things, which I
think should help us figure out-help us to confirm in our
opinions the fact that he had planned this, the fact that he
had been thinking about it for some time.... So he admits
to the police before he had acquired sophistication of learning that murder isn't just murder, it is of varying degrees
and varying types and varying punishments, back then he
admits that he began thinking of getting rid of Dorothy
and Marion, way back at 7:00 0 'clock. ... "
Even if we assume that in some cases a testimonial confession can make harmless the erroneous admission of an
extrajudicial confession, defendant's testimony in this case
did not do so. His testimony was not only impelled by the
erroneous admission of the extrajudicial confession, but would
have supported a verdict of second degree murder. The
erroneously admitted confession rebutted his defense that
he was guilty of no more than second degree murder. Whether
or not its admission into evidence was necessarily prejudicial,
it is reasonably probable that had it been excluded, a result
more favorable to defendant would have been reached. Accordingly, the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 43h; People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818,
886 [299 P.2d 245].)
Other questions remain that may arise on retrial.
[4] A motion picture :film. of the victim at the scene of

)

when you say you were 'thinking of doing it"
A. I mean hitting
Marion. I was thinking about the domino game too; they said they
would be there around that time. Q. Were you thinking in terms of an
alibi' A. Not then, no. Q. Why did you want to hurt Marion'
A. Actually, I didn't want to hurt Marion alone. I would hurt Marion
or Dorothy or anybody at the time that was with them. . • . " Later,
after a rambling, nonresponsive answer to a question, the interview continued: "Q. The original question was-- A. I know. Q. You are
building up to why and when you decided to do this. It has been kind
of a long explanation and I wondered if we lost the point. We were up
to Tuesday night. A. Around 7 :00 I had just come from the park, playing basketball. I got to the record shop on Milbrae and Oeeanview.
Dorothy was standing out there. Again I asked if she was sure she was
coming back. She said she didn't know, maybe. She mentioned Marion
again. Q. That you and Marion were having an affair' A. Yes, she still
thought I was. She wasn't too sure. I told her it was just one time.
That's when I thought mnybe if I could get rid of Dorothy or Marion, or
hurt Dorothy or Marion, I could get it off my mind."
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the killing was admitted over defendant's objection. It appears on the face of the record 2 that the court failed to "weigh
the probative value of the' photographs in resolving a material issue as against the danger of prejudice to the defendant through needless arousal of the passions of the jurors."
(People v. Ford, 60 Ca1.2d 772, 801 [36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388
P .2d 892].) If the motion picture is offered in evidence on
retrial, the court must determine its admissibility by weighing
its probative value against the danger of prejudice.
[6] The notes that convinced defendant of the homosexuality of his wife and the victim were written in three
high school notebooks. Defendant contends that the notebooks should have been admitted in their entirety. Defendant testified that he learned of the girls' homosexual relationship by reading the entire notebooks. Upon request of the
prosecution, defendant marked the passages that indicated
such a relationship to him. The defense was allowed to read
these passages to the jury; some 16 passages from various
"notes were read, and most were reread by defense counsel
in his closing argument. The trial court refused, however,
to allow the notebooks to be introduced because the great
bulk of the material in them was irrelevant and immaterial.
Although the passages read from the notebooks were not
used as hearsay, but as circumstantial evidence of defendant's state of mind (see People v. Marsh, 58 Cal.2d 732, 737740 [26 Cal.Rptr. 300, 376 P.2d 300] ; 6 Wigmore, Evidence
(3d ed.) § 1789; 2 id., § 740), these passages were apparently
only a small part of the three notebooks. Defendant was
allowed to present whatever passages he considered relevant,
and he has not shown that their probative value would ~e
t>nhanced by reading the rest of the DoteS. There was therefore no abuse of discretion in refusing to admit the entire·
notebooks.
At the trial on the issue of sanity, defendant sought to
establish that he was suffering from a transitory or temporary
functional psychosis at the time of the killing and was insane.
Two psychiatrists testified for the prosecution that defendant was sane at the time of the killing and that temporary
psychoses are never functional in nature. Dr. Robert G.
KapJan, a clinical psychologist who also testified at the trial
on the issue of guilt, testified for the defense that because
of a temporary functional psychosis at the time of the kill21n ruling on defendant's objection, the court stated: "Well, I ",iewed
[the film) nnd I feel that while it is not pleasant to look at it is a legal
exhibit and it is material for the purposes offered."

1

"I'
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, ing, defendant could not distinguish between right and wrong
and did not know the nature and quality of his act.
[6a] Dr. Richard E. Worthington was also called by the
defense. Dr. Worthington testified on voir dire that he obtained the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the University
of Chicago in 1940 under the Committee on Human Development, specializing in clinical psychology. Although he took
the equivalent of about one year of medical school courses
in physiology, neurology, and genetics, he did not attend
medical school. He testified that he was "the fastest man
to go through the University of Chicago"; he passed from
freshman to Ph.D. in four and one-half years by taking three
times the normal number of courses. He taught psychology
. at the University of Chicago and Cornell University, and
worked as a 'psychologist at the Menninger Foundation for
two years. He has published articles dealing with a wide
range of topics within the field of psychology. He was certified by the Psychology Examining Committee of the State
Board of Medical Examiners in 1958 (see Bus. & Prof. Code,
. § 2940 et seq.), and at the time of trial was vice chairman
of that committee, which consists of eight members appointed
by the Governor. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2910.) He was engaged in private practice in San Diego primarily in the
treatment of emotional disturbances.
Dr. Worthington was excused by the court because of his
lack of medical training. The court ruled that only a medical
doctor is qualified to testify as an expert on the issue of sanity. a

)

8The court's ruling was somewhat ambiguous. After questioning the
witness concerning his medical training, the court simply stated: "The
witness is not qualified as an expert on the subject of insanity under the
rules, as I understand them, and that is it, period. The witness will be
excused. " During argument on a motion for new trial, the court attempted to clarify its position. "I didn't find, I invite your attention
to this, I did not find that a psychologist, as such, would not be qualified
and on the ease of the other man [Dr. Kaplan] I simply asked the question, in the presence of the jury-to the District Attorney I may have
gone so far as to say I had my doubts about his qualifications, and he
said he had no objection to that man testifying, so he testified. Now,
I still don't think it is proper and you could argue all day and I wouldn't
ehange my ruling. . . . Here is a man that comes in, glib of tongue,
hasn't had a day's medical training at all and he is going to qualify
as an expert on sanity, when a part of the mental condition of legal
insanity, as we know it in California, is a medical proposition and I
would like to see the Supreme Court tell me I am wrong. There is no
use to argue that point any further. I am adamant in my opinion on
that. " Despite the eourt's statement that it did not hold that a psyehologist as such is not qualified, it apparently based its exclusion of Dr.
Worthington on the ground tha~ he did Dot have sufficient medical
training.,

800
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Defendant contends that this ruling was erroneous. 4
,:..:.,
[1] A witness is qualified to testify about a matter calling
for an expert opinion if his peculiar skill, training, or experience enable him to form an opinion that will be useful to
the jury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 9; Estate of
Toomes, 54 Cal. 509, 514-515 [35 Am.Rep. 82]; Oakes v.'
Chapman, 158 Cal.App.2d 78, 83-84 [322 P.2d 241]; Me-'
Cormick, Evidence, § 13.) [8] Although the determina-.
tion of the qualification of a proffered witness is ordinarily'
within the discretion of the trial court (People v. Busch,
56 Ca1.2d 868, 878 [16 Cal.Rptr. 898, 366 P.2d 314]; 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.) § 561), the standards used in the.
exercise of this discretion, like other questions of law, are
subject to review. Recent cases considering the point have
· held that a qualified psychologist can testify concerning
a defendant's mental condition. (Jenkins v. United States,
307 F.2d 637, 643-646; Hidden v. Mutual Life Ins. 00., 217
F.2d 818, 821; People v. Hawthorne, 293 Mich. 15, 22-26'~
1291 N.W. 205]; State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 297-299 [347
P.2d 312]; Watson v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 5, 8 [273
S.W.2d 879]; cf. Oarter v. State (Okla. Crim. App.) 376
P.2d 351, 359-360. But see Dobbs v. State, 191 Ark. 236,
239-242 [85 S.W.2d 694]; cf.· State v. Gibson, 15 N.J. 384,
391 [105 A.2d 1]. See generally Lassen, The Psychologist 48;
an Expert Witness, 50 A.B.A.J. 239; Louisell,The Psycholo- ,
gist in Today', Legal World, 39 Minn.L.Rev. 235; Scheflen"~l
· The Psychologist as a Witness, 32 Pa.B.A.Q. 329.} Manyj
cases have also noted the use of psychologists in criminal cases "1
. ' without objection or comment. (E.g., p.,eople v. Busch, supra, /~'l
· 56 Ca1.2d, at p. 875; People v. McNlchoZ, 100 Cal.App.2d .~
554, 558 [224 P.2d 21] ; United States v. Chancller, 12 F.Supp .. '<)
230, 237; see also People v. Spigno, 156 Cal.App.2d 279, 288- '
291 [319 P.2d 458].)
':1;
[6b] The defense attempted to prove through two psy- .
chologists that defendant was suffering from a temporary .'
.

.~

4The prosecution did not object to the' use of Dr. Kaplan because his
views had already been presented to the jury at the trial on the issue of
guilt. The court, however, made the following comment to the jury on
Dr. Kaplan's testimony: t t l will just simply instruct the jury that I
don't know whether this witness is qualified either, because he holds no
license to practice medicine, any kind of medicine in this state, he is not
a psychiatrist and he is not licensed as such. • . . I may say this to the .
. jury, that a lay person, like we are, may testify as to .•• our opinion
as to the sanity of an individual if we are acquainted with him and with
his habits of life. . . ." This comment also raised the question whether
only a medical doctor is qualified as an expert on legal sanity.
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functional psychosis at the time of the crime that made him
legally insane. The prosecution's psychiatric experts denied
that such a disability could exist. Without the psychologists,
therefore, defendant could not establish an insanity defense.
The alleged disability did not involve a matter of mental
illness completely within the realm of a physician. [9] A
functional disorder is by definition nonorganic and without a
biological cause. [6el The trial court erred in ruling that
only one with medical training could testify on the issue.
[10] It does not follow that all psychologists are competent to give an expert opinion on sanity. Many practicing
psychologists are not concerned with problems of abnormal
psychology and are not familiar with the clinical branch of
their field. A certain level of training and experience is
also necessary; one with only an undergraduate interest in
psychology who has since pursued other fields would certainly not be qualified to give an expert opinion. (Cf. People
. v. Chambers, 162 Cal.App.2d 215, 219-220 [328 P.2d 236].)
Moreover, not all questions relating to legal sanity can be
answered by a psychologist. (See 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d
ed.) § 555, p. 634.) The interpretation of an electroencephalogram or the physiological effect of drugs, for example, may
be beyond the ken of a psychologist without medical training.
Whether a psychologist qualifies as an expert on sanity in a
particular case depends on the facts of that case, the questions propounded to the witness, and his peculiar qualifications.
. The judgment is reversed.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J'J Peek, J.,Dooling,

J.,-

concurred.

SCHAUER, J.. Dissenting. - In my view the evidence
which was properly presented to the jury amply supports
the verdicts as to guilt, sanity, and penalty. It must be recognized, however, that under the present status of relevant law
as developed in Escobedo v. IUinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [84
S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], and People v. Dorado (1965)
ante, p. 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169,398 P.2d 361] (and made applicable ex post facto in favor of the accused and against the
People), the prosecuting attorney, properly under the old law
-Retired A880eiate Justiee of the Supreme Court sitting under assign·
ment b7 the Chairman of the Judicial Couneil.

,

.,
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but erroneously under the new, in his argument emphasized
the difference between defendant's fact-statements as given
before, and those given after, he had conferred with counsel
and thereby "had acquired sophistication of learning that
murder iBn't just murder, it is of varying degrees and varying
types and varying punishments, ••. "
The old rule looked with favor on ascertaining the truth;
the new rule looks with more favor on giving the illiterate
an equal opportunity with the literate to falsify to his own
advantage. Thus must police and judicial skills in sorting
.fact from fiction be developed the more; and thus will the
practiced discernment of the trial judge-and of penal boards
-probably have better opportunity to correctly recognize
basic character and act accordingly. The difference between
honesty and cupidity should not be overlooked. Enlightened
perjury-or the giving of further opportunity to present itdoes not appeal to me as a basis for finding a miscarriage of
justice. In the circumstances of this case I am not persuaded
that the verdict and judgment work a miscarriage of justice.
(See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4%; PeopZe v. Watson (1956)
46 Ca1.2d 818, 835-836 [299 P.2d 243] [12].)
I must also specifically dissent from the majority's holding
. that the trial court erred as a matte,. of law in ruling that
. .the witness, Richard E. Worthington, Ph.D. (he had taught
psychology and treated emotional disturbances) was not
qualified to testify helpfully as an expert witness on any
material issue of fact then before the court. A trial judge's
discretion in this area should be well-nigh absolute. He is in
a position far superior to that of any appellate court to
appraise the significance of evidence. An appellate judge
can merely read' what a transcriber typed from. what a
phonographic reporter's notes reflect of what the reporter
believed he heard. Perhaps an electronic recording device
also recorded on disc or tape the sounds of the courtroom.
But human reporter or electronic impression get only sounds;
the attentive trial judge sees as well as hears. And as f!fI1ery
experienced trial judge knows, that which he sees may well
be more truth revealing than that which he hears.
..,- From my reading of the record I cannot conclude that
the trial judge in his handling of this case was other than
fair, competent, careful, patient and sound in all material
rulings, including his denial of a motion for a new trial.
For the reasons above stated I would affirm the judgment.
KcComb, J., concurred.

